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ANNOUNCEMENTS
The midwinter meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association
will be held Saturday, January 16, 1932, at the Claypool Hotel
in Indianapolis.
Mr. Julius Henry Cohen of New York City will be the speaker
at the dinner that evening. His subject will be the unauthorized
practice of law. Officers of the Indiana Bankers' Association
will be guests. Members of the bar association may, and are
asked to, invite as their dinner guests representatives of their
local trust companies.
In the afternoon, beginning at 1:30 o'clock, the association
will consider committee reports on a number of important issues,
including the one to be discussed by Mr. Cohen. Revision of the
procedure for disbarment and an Indiana judicial council, with
appropriate bills therefor, probably will be recommended by
the committee on jurisprudence and law reform. The special
committee on re-organization of the association is considering
and may recommend an incorporated bar such as exists in Cali-
fornia and seven other states.
All committees have been at work but will have their final
meeting in the morning beginning at ten o'clock when the board
of managers will also be in session to consider, with other busi-
ness, the advisability of a junior bar.
On November 28th, the chairmen of all committees met with
the president at the Columbia Club to co-ordinate the work of
their committees. The editor of the Law Journal was present
and believes that a balanced program of vital interest to the
association will be presented at the midwinter meeting.
COMMENT
CHAIN STORE TAXATION
On May 18, 1931,. the United States Supreme Court upheld
the Indiana chain store tax law.' This last fall the Supreme
Court denied a rehearing in this case, and also upheld a similar
chain store tax law of the state of North Carolina,2 so that it
1 State Board of Tax Commisioners of Indiana et al. v. Jackson, 51 S.
Ct. 540 (1931).
2 faxwell v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 51 S. Ct. (1931).
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may now be taken for granted that chain store taxation is con-
stitutional.
The decision in the Indiana case was a five to four decision
by the five members of the Supreme Court ranked as liberals.
Is the decision a liberal decision?
The Indiana law involved a tax of three dollars upon one
store, ten dollars upon two to five stores, fifteen dollars upon
.six to ten stores, twenty dollars upon eleven to twenty stores,
and twenty-five dollars upon twenty-one or more stores operated
under the same general management, supervision, or ownership. 3
The North Carolina law provided for a license tax of fifty dol-
lars upon each store in excess of one operated by the same
individual or corporation.4 Hence the fact that a tax was levied
upon every store under the Indiana law would seem to be
irrevelant.
Jackson of Indianapolis operated two hundred twenty-five
stores in that city, and was required to pay a tax of five thousand
four hundred forty-three dollars, a tax eighteen hundred times
as large as that paid by the operator of only one store, although
two department stores in the same city each did a business eight
times as large as his total business, and one of them operated
one hundred twenty-four separate departments, and the other
eighty-six separate departments. 5
If the above Indiana law was enacted under the police power,
in order to be held constitutional there would have to be found
a sufficient social interest and proper classification. The law,
if a police measure, would undoubtedly be bad on both of these
grounds.
In the first place, no sufficient social interest could be found
to uphold the law. If any social interest were to be found it
would have to be found in the protection of the independent
merchants. It would be just as easy to find a social interest
in the protection of chain stores. The proper answer un-
-doubtedly is that there is no social interest in the favor of
3 Indiana Acts, 1929, c. 207.
4 N. C. Acts, 1929, c. 345, sec. 162.
! -During the past two years more than eighty bills designed to place
heavier tax burdens upon chain store systems than upon independent
retail merchants have been introduced into the legislatures of the vari-
ous states, and seven of these bills have been enacted into laws. During
the next sessions of our state legislatures undoubtedly more such laws will
be enacted.
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either one of these classes as such. If there is any social in-
terest, it would have to be a broader social interest and one for
the protection of society as a whole. If the matter were looked
at from this standpoint, the public as a whole might find more
benefit in the protection of chain stores than in the protection
of independent stores because of the lower prices, better goods,
and better service which the public seems to be obtaining. Up
to date the cases seem to be against the exercise of any such
police power. Even the suggestion of the prevention of mono-
poly has not been enough to influence the courts to uphold such
an exercise of the police power.6 That the statute was an exer-
cise of the police power was not pressed in the lower court, and
the Supreme Court treated the law as a tax measure. Yet it is
obvious that the purpose of the law was really to hurt the chain
stores and help the independent merchants. The independent
merchants have been the small, but aggressive, minority which
has been backing such legislation, and, wherever legislation has
been passed, they have been the procuring cause thereof.
In the second place, it is doubtful if the Supreme Court would
hold that it is a proper classification for the police power to
put chain stores into one class, and other stores into another.
A court which has held it is not proper classification for a
minimum wage law to put women into one class and men into
another ;7 nor for the purpose of regulation to put co-operative
gins into one class and other gins into another;8 nor for the
purpose of insurance to put auto drivers carrying dairy products
into one class and all other auto drivers into another class9
would hardly uphold as a police regulation a classification put-
ting chain stores into one class and other stores into anotherlG
6 Liggett v. Baldridge, 27& U. S. 105 (1928); Keystone Grocery Co. v.
Huster, Alleghany Co. Ct., Md., equity case No. 10,922 (1927), unreported;
Becker and Hess, "The Chain Store License Tax and the Fourteenth
Amendment," 7 North Carolina Law Rev. 115; Simms, "Chain Stores and
the Courts," 17 Virginia Law Rev. 313; Strawn, "Baiting the Chain
Store," (November, 1930) Chain Store Age 27; 40 Yale Law Jour. 431;
15 Minn. Law Rev. 341; 77 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 426.
7 Atkins v. Children's Hospital, etc., 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
s Frost v. Corporation, 278 U. S. 515 (1929).
9 Smith v. Cahoon, 51 S. Ct. 582 (1931).
10 State courts have refused to uphold anti-department store laws be-
cause they could find no reasonable basis for distinguishing between them
and other stores. State ex rel Wyatt v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375 (1900);
Chicago v. Netcher, 183 I1. 104 (1899).
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If the law were a tax law for the purpose of regulation, or
a police regulation in the guise of taxation, under the latest
decisions of the United States Supreme Court the law would
be unconstitutional"' although it is true these latest decisions
are in conflict with some earlier decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. 12 If the Indiana law was not a direct exercise
of the police power, it would seem to be an exercise of the
police power in the guise of taxation, or an exercise of the
power of taxation for the purpose of police regulation. The
height of the tax as the number of stores increases would seem
to prove this, but the court repudiated this interpretation as
much as the police power interpretation.
Since the court treated the Indiana law as a revenue measure
pure and simple, its constitutionality will depend upon whether
or not it was for a public purpose, was based upon proper classi-
fication, and was uniform, if the Indiana rule of uniformity
applies to such a tax.
While the Indiana constitution 13 has a requirement of uni-
formity for taxation, it has been held by the Supreme Court of
Indiana that this provision relates only to property taxes, and
does not relate to inheritance taxes,14 or to excise taxes.' 5
Hence the rule of uniformity is not involved by the law under
consideration.
It has been suggested that in order to have a public purpose
there would have to be found a public purpose in the preserva-
tion of the independent merchant,16 or a public purpose in pre-
venting monopoly.17 However, neither of these suggestions is
sound. Evidently the writers were thinking of the police power
instead of taxation. Public purpose for taxation can be found
if the revenue obtained from taxation is devoted to any public
purpose. The motive for the taxation or the method whereby
the tax is raised is irrelevant. The vital thing is how the money
is to be spent. Since no special purpose for this taxation was
11 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20; (1922); Trusler v.
Crooks, 269 U. S. 475 (1926).
12 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869); Head Money Cases,
112 U. S. 580 (1884); McCray v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
13 Constitution of Indiana, Article 10, Sec. 1.
14 Crittenberger v. State, 189 Ind. 411 (1920).
1 5Gafill v. Bracken, 195 Ind. 551 (1925).
16 Becker and Hess, "The Chain Store License Tax and the Fourteenth
Amendment," supra.
17 40 Yale Law Jour. 436, supra.
COMMENTS
named, of course the money obtained from taxation would go
into the common fund with other revenue, and no question
could be made as to public purpose.
If the law in question is a true tax law, then, the one great
constitutional question involved in it is the question of classi-
fication for taxation.
The equality clause of the United States constitution, accord-
ing to repeated decisions of the United States Su'preme Court,
forbids class legislation, but does permit classification; but in
order to have proper classification the classification must not
be arbitrary, but founded upon some reasonable distinction. A
mere difference is not enough. There must be a real and sub-
stantial difference bearing a reasonable relation to the subject
of the legislation. All persons similarly situated must be dealt
with similarly. There must be a substantial, rational basis for
a disparity of legislative treatment, and this basis must have
some relation to the purpose of the statute. There must be a
necessity for classification springing from manifest peculiarities
clearly distinguishing those of one class from those of each of
the other classes.18
In applying this test the United States Supreme Court has
been very liberal. It has upheld a classification which has put
planters and farmers in one class and other people in another
class for the purpose of taxing the business of refining sugar ;19
a classification which has put one kind of corporations in one
class and other kinds of corporations in another ;20 a classifica-
tion of residents and nonresidents for the purpose of an inherit-
ance tax ;21 a classification of people into lineal heirs and colla-
teral heirs for the purpose of an inheritance tax ;22 a classifica-
tion of warehouses into those situated on the right of way of a
railroad and others for a license tax ;23 a classification of laun-
dries into hand laundries and steam laundries for the purpose
of a license tax ;24 a classification of bankers into private bank-
iN State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana, v. Jackson, supra;
Lozilsville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 37 (1928); Crescent Oil Co. V.
Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 137 (1921); Southern Railway Co. v. Greene,
216 U. S. 400, 417 (1910); Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, 281 (1889).
19 American Sugar Co. v. Louisana, 179 U. S. 89 (1900).
20 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911).
21 Maxwell v. Bvgbee, 250 U. S. 525 (1919).
22 Alagoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283 (1898).
23 Cargill v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452 (1901).
24 Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 (1912).
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ers and others lending money on different security for the pur-
pose of a license tax;25 a classification of theatres into those
charging higher admissions and those charging smaller admis-
sions for the purpose of license fees ;26 a classification of per-
sons into those selling from stores and those selling by means of
wagons for a license tax;27 and a classification of persons sell-
ing merchandise with profit sharing certificates and those not
using such certificates for an occupation tax.28 Yet, in all these
cases, in spite of its liberality, the Supreme Court, with the
possible exception of the hand laundry case, has found some
real reason for the classifications it has upheld.
Where the state courts and the United States Supreme Court
have not been able to find a reason for classifications, they have
held them unconstitutional. When it has come to cases closely
resembling the chain store tax classification herein, classifica-
tions have not been upheld, because the courts have not been
able to find any real reason therefor. The North Carolina
Supreme Court held unconstitutional its first chain store tax
law which levied a license tax upon each retail store operated
by a person maintaining six or more stores, 29 but when its law
was changed to impose a tax on each store in excess of one,
the North Carolina Supreme Court, for some reason, upheld the
constitutionality of the new law,3 0 although it is difficult to see
any distinction in principle between the two cases. The Indiana
law above referred to was declared unconstitutional by three
judges of the United States statutory court sitting in the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division,3 1 and two
other United States district courts have followed the rule laid
down in the Jackson case.3 2 The Georgia Supreme Court de-
clared its chain store tax law unconstitutional after reversing
the decision of the Superior Court for Fulton county. 33 The
Supreme Court of Kentucky held unconstitutional a license tax
25 Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477 (1913).
26 Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61 (1913).
27 Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 (1914).
28 Rast v. Van Deman, 240 U. S. 342 (1916).
29 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Doughton, 196 N. C. 145 (1928).
30 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433 (1930).
31 Jackson v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 38 Fed. (2nd) 652
(1930).
32 Southern Grocery Stores v. South Carolina Tax Commission, (S. Car.)
(July 18, 1930); Penney Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell, (Miss.) (Sept. 9, 1930).
33 F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Harrison, 156 S. E. 904 (1931).
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on cash and carry grocery stores higher than the tax upon other
grocery stores. 34 In the recent case of Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania:3 the United States Supreme Court held that it
was unconstitutional to put corporations engaged in general
taxicab business into one class and individuals and partnerships
engaged in the same business into another class for the pur-
pose of a tax upon gross receipts.
In the light of the above decisions it would seem that both
from the standpoint of authority and of principle there is no
basis for classifying chain stores in one class and other stores
in another class for the purpose of license taxes. In the argu-
ment of the Indiana case a number of characteristics of the
chain stores were urged upon the Supreme Court, evidently suc-
cessfully. Among these were quantity buying, buying for cash,
skill in buying, warehousing, large capital, sales policy, greater
turnover, better advertising, standard displays, concentration
of management, special accounting, and standardization of poli-
cies, management, and goods, but as was pointed out in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Sutherland, all of these characteris-
tics with one exception are not attributable to the chain stores
as such. They might equally well characterize any other stores.
The only essential difference between chain stores and other
stores is the fact of the number of stores and unified control.
It would seem that this is not a sufficient basis for classification
for taxation. It is both arbitrary and without rational basis
for disparity of legislative treatment. Many other enterprises
like banks, gasoline stations, and public utility holding compan-
ies have many branches or subsidiaries, and unified control; and
great department stores have departments, and unified control.
If number of stores and unified control were to be the basis of
classification for taxation, it would seem that all these other
enterprises should be included. Yet the Supreme Court upheld
the classification.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court can be
rationalized only by taking the position that the court practically
dispenses with the requirement of classification and the pro-
tection of the equality clause; thereby overrules the decision
in the Pennsylvania Taxicab case; and has embarked upon a
new policy of giving the states a free hand in the matter of
taxation because of the need of revenue and because "the power
.' City of Danville v. Quaker Maid, 211 Ky. 677 (1926).
35277 U. S. 389 (1928).
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of taxation is fundamental to the very existence of the govern-
ment of the states." This position, of course, gives the states
more freedom in the matter of taxation. This has always been
the position of Justice Holmes, and it has been announced in
a number of his dissenting opinions. 36 This now has evidently
become the position of the majority of the court. Perhaps the
result of this decision is also the levying of a tax according to
ability to pay, although perhaps this is more of a coincidence
than a result. Of course, as has already been pointed out, there
is no difficulty about finding a public purpose. But if the court
is going to dispense with the requirement of classification and
the protection of equal laws, one cannot help but wonder what
will be the final result. Will the Supreme Court permit the taxa-
tion of big stores higher than small stores, the taxation of stores
making big sales more than stores making small sales, the taxa-
tion of cash and carry stores and not other stores, the taxation
of department stores and not other stores? If there are no
limitations on classification for taxation, it would seem that any
sort of classification, no matter how arbitrary or unreasonable,
should be upheld. What the results of such a doctrine may
possibly be in the future, it is hard to foresee.3 7
36 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Liggett v. Baldridge,
supra; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921); Lockner v. New York,
198 U. S. 45 (1905); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra.
37 A question which now arises under the Indiana law is whether or not
gasoline filling stations come within its terms so that they must pay the
tax. Sec. 1, Sec. 2, and that part of Sec. 5 prescribing fees, of the Indiana
act, name only "store" or "stores," but the first part of See. 5, referring
to the persons to pay the fees, names "stores or mercantile establish-
ments." Does the law include gasoline filling stations? By the usual rules
of interpretation probably the act should be confined to stores (Sutherland,
Statutory Construction). If this were done probably it should be held that
gasoline filling stations are stores (Gunther v. Atlantic Refining Co., 277
Pa. 289). If this were not done, it clearly should be held that gasoline
filling stations are mercantile establishments.
A restaurant is held not to be a store (although it might well be said
that it is selling food instead of service). (In re Wentworth Lunch Co.,
159 Fed. 413; Debenham v. Short, 199 S. W. 1147 (Tex.). But a harness
repair shop for repairing and selling harness (Campbell v. State, 170 Ark.
936), a bakery (Richards v. Wash. F. & M. Ins. Co., 60 Mich. 420), a
butcher shop (Petty v. State, 58 Ark. 1), a junk shop (Pitts v. City of
Mass. 419) have been held to be stores.
Under such decisions it would seem that gasoline filling stations should
also be included in the term stores, and the case of Gunther v. Atlantic Re-
fining Co., supra, has done so.
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It is difficult to answer the question of whether or not this
decision of the United States Supreme Court is a liberal decision.
Looked at from the standpoint of giving the states a free hand,
it looks liberal, but looked at from the standpoint of the indivi-
dual taxpayer, it looks very illiberal and conservative. From
the latter standpoint it looks like a reactionary decision for the
benefit of the individual merchants operating unit stores. It is
doubtful whether or not the decision will save the consuming
public in taxation as much as it will lose them in the extra costs
which will be imposed upon them; but if the social interest in
the political institution of the state is more important than the
social interest in social and economic progress, probably this
decision is a wise decision, and can be called a liberal decision.
HUGH E. WILLIS.
Indiana University School of Law.
